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This paper analyses NHS Local Improvement Finance Trust (LIFT), a relatively new 
policy that shifts UK primary care premises into corporate ownership. LIFT is a more 
radical version of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), and may indicate the future 
direction of neoliberal welfare services. Like PFI, LIFT foregrounds issues of risk and 
regulation, enabling their reconceptualisation. This echoes certain themes present in the 
sociology of risk, including the idea that the welfare state has created and amplified, 
rather than managed, risk. Under LIFT, risks are constructed as (a) primarily economic 
and (b) primarily from the point of view of the large commercial organisations involved. 
Evidence presented here depicts banks as risk averse, challenging assumptions that 
private firms display risk-taking behaviour. 
 
The prioritisation of economic risks is shown to amplify social risks, and to produce 
threats to social regulation. These threats are amplified by unequal power relationships 
within these new ‘local health economies’. It is argued that LIFT is undermining the 
NHS’s social embeddedness in local areas, partly by threatening the position of general 
practitioners and other small business or community organisations. Ultimately the model 
is likely to generate new social and economic risks currently obscured by official 
discourse around LIFT. 
 
Introduction 
Policy change both enables and is enabled by new concepts of risk and regulation. In 
the UK, discourses of risk have been a key means of justifying new ways of involving the 
private sector in providing public services, such as PFI (the Private Finance Initiative, in 
which facilities are designed, built, financed, owned, and maintained by private firms, 
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and leased back to the public sector). Supporters argue that such policies transfer risk to 
the party best placed to manage it, and quantifications and comparisons of risk figure 
centrally within PFI Value for Money assessments (Stapleton et al 2004). This paper will 
focus on NHS Local Improvement Finance Trust (LIFT), a new organisational form 
developed from PFI, which is an example of the complex models of privatisation and 
part-privatisation currently transforming public services in the UK. 
 
 An official narrative sees public sector failure as creating pressure for these new 
procurement methods. In a report supporting the LIFT model, consultancy company 
Capita states that “[o]ne of the main reasons why pfi was adopted by government in 
general and the health sector in particular was in the forefront of the policy was to 
transfer the major risks [sic], firstly of delay and secondly, cost overruns which had 
featured prominently in number of very high profile projects which went badly awry.” 
(Capita 2007:14)  
 
But this oft-rehearsed story does not explain why the tale is being told in the language of 
risk, or why risk transfer is seen as the appropriate solution to the ‘problem’. Risk is 
fashionable: but what does it do here? What kinds of risks are being constructed and 
prioritised – and who is bearing them? Finally, how is social regulation (by which I mean 
the ways in which contemporary institutions are embedded in, and supported by, civil 
societies) working when confronted with new structures and new risks? 
 
 
LIFT: a dramatic shift in primary care provision 
 
Before LIFT (Local Improvement Finance Trust), UK primary care (care outside 
hospitals) was located between state and market. When the National Health Service was 
created in 1948, GPs (general practitioners or family doctors) did not become NHS 
employees, whereas hospital doctors did. GPs remained “independent contractors” 
running local surgeries, selling their services to the state. The majority of surgeries 
continued to be owned by GPs, and over the next fifty years the resulting patchwork of 
regulated small producers proved highly stable. As GPs consolidated their independent 
professional power base within the NHS, investment in primary care premises and 
facilities remained limited (Pollock 2004) 
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 If the NHS stayed on the margins of direct primary care provision for fifty years, 
corporate capital was even less involved. A minority of GPs rented premises from 
specialist private landlords but the market was too small and fragmented to interest large 
firms (whose corporate structures might also not be best placed to deal with GPs). As 
post-1997 Labour administrations promoted PFI in the NHS, initially this focused upon 
acute care (hospitals), not primary health care buildings. LIFT overcomes the problem of 
low corporate interest in small projects by bundling buildings together within a long-term 
partnership approach, which ties local NHS organisations to a majority corporate owned 
LIFT company (LIFTCo) (Aldred 2007). (By contrast, PFI creates a company to manage 
one particular project.) LIFT is now under way in around half of English NHS primary 
care trusts. In these areas NHS organisations have signed an “exclusivity clause” stating 
that over during a 20-year “Strategic Partnering Agreement” a local LIFTCo has 
Quantifications and comparisons of risk sole rights to develop any new primary care 
premises (such as GP surgeries and health centres) in its area. It will then lease space 
in the buildings to service providers, also providing some support services. 
 
LIFT mandates a “public sector shareholding” which means that local NHS Trusts 
must purchase a 20% stake in “their” LIFTCo. Another 20% belongs to the national 
agency Partnerships UK (until recently itself also a PPP) and the remaining 60% to the 
private investors. These investors generally comprise a financial institution, a support 
services company, and a construction company. The obligation in LIFT areas to provide 
new primary care premises through the LIFTCo represents a substantial change in the 
provision of primary care accommodation, albeit one that will take place gradually. For 
example, primary care trust maintenance departments are likely to transfer over time to 
the support services company involved, but this will not happen with the signing of the 
initial contract. Similarly clinical, other support services, and even local authority-run 
services might transfer in the future (Aldred 2007). 
 
 The data discussed here are derived from an embedded case study of NHS LIFT, 
using interviewing, non-participant observation, and analysis of official documents. This 
research included analysis of the policy at a national level, an in-depth study of one 
particular LIFT area (and the numerous organisations constituting it), and 
complementary studies of three LIFT comparator areas. The narrative draws upon 
research into the broader policy framework surrounding LIFT and PFI. 
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Talking about risk: policy and public sector projects 
The case of LIFT demonstrates how certain themes in the various sociologies of 
risk chime with the dominant contemporary PPP1 risk narrative. Beck (1992) has 
characterised contemporary societies as “risk societies”. Here risk becomes part of a 
cautionary modernisation narrative: modern societies create risks that they are ill-
equipped to manage, and management strategies themselves come to amplify risk. Pro-
PPP discourse, which highlights risk transfer, has some similarities to Beck’s approach 
and to Giddens’ (1991) related analysis of primary and secondary modernity. 
 
The Giddensian approach would suggest that under primary modernity the public 
sector was trusted with large projects to contain and manage social problems. This 
would be counterposed to secondary modernity, in which there is a growing awareness 
of the problems caused by these projects themselves: for example, large capital projects 
may often over-run or go over budget. PFI could be seen as developing from the 
realisation that public sector capital projects exacerbate or even cause, rather than 
manage, risk. 
 
Indeed “social entrepreneurs” within the “LIFT community” promote PPP as 
offering to bypass the state in favour of a dynamic collaboration between private sector 
organisations, service users and community groups (Aldred 2007b). These new 
networks would join together non-state and civil society actors within new hybrid 
organisational forms, responding to disillusionment with state provision. Risk stories that 
explain and justify PPP focus upon the failure of only one type of large primary modern 
institution: the state. By contrast, large corporations are cast as privileged carriers of late 
modern virtues such as flexibility and networking (Aldred 2007c). 
 
This discourse echoes analyses of risk as governmentality stressing a shift from 
centralised state government to more diffuse, networked governance. Documents 
supporting PPP speak of the benefits of “networking” over the “silo” mentality allegedly 
represented by traditional public sector service demarcations (Aldred 2007). Such soft 
governance is attractive to managers for a number of reasons, not least because service 
                                                           
1
 Here I am using PPP to refer to PFI, LIFT, and similar initiatives such as Building Schools for the 
Future. 
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users and/or staff may become “responsibilised” and internalise managerial goals (Rose 
1996). But under closer examination LIFT and PFI sit uncomfortably within this scene: 
instead, I show below that a focus on the narrowly conceived economic (primarily 
constructed from the viewpoint of private sector partners) risks costly failures to deal with 
social risks and provide effective social regulation. 
 
The analysis here calls into question associations commonly made between the 
private sector and pro-risk attitudes both in PPP discourse and in the sociology of risk. 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) associate individualistic attitudes and acceptance of risk-
taking with industry and enterprise, and hierarchical attitudes to risk with bureaucratic 
state organisations such as government regulators. Official discourse promoting 
privatisation echoes this view. The National Audit Office argues (NAO 2006:3) that “a 
culture of risk aversion and a lack of commercially skilled individuals” obstruct the 
commercialisation of government activities. 
 
Among the public-private elite, the superiority of the private sector’s approach to 
risk is taken for granted. NAO Auditor General Sir John Bourn told a conference of PFI 
industry managers in 2003 that state failure to understand, recognise, and deal with risk 
has meant that the public sector has been “in a somnambulistic way, as I put it, walking 
off the end of a cliff.” Trying to avoid risks not only prevents innovation, but is ultimately 
self-defeating, creating additional risks. Similarly, at a national LIFT symposium in 
London in 2006 attended by senior NHS and private sector managers, “civil servants” 
(central government bureaucrats) were criticised as stalling service improvement through 
a refusal to accept any risks (Aldred 2007). Such discourse occludes the politics of risk 
in favour of a one-dimensional spectrum of risk preferences, frequently mapped onto a 
private/public distinction.  However, my research shows a more complex picture, with the 
construction of “economic” risks generating unforeseen “social” risks. 
 
Risky business: commodification and entrepreneurialism 
 
The calculation of risk does not necessarily imply its commodification: calculating 
allows risk to be spread over a number of projects, reducing uncertainty. A public sector 
organisation might – for example – have fifty different small projects each with an 
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estimated 2% risk of failure.2 The authority would expect that one of its projects is likely 
to fail, and can plan accordingly. Risk is then normalised as part of organisational 
planning, and from this perspective the state seems well placed to manage it. Unlike 
most commercial organisations the state is involved in many different areas, so that risk 
can be pooled over projects with different types and levels of risk. 
 
However, with the growth of policies such as LIFT, the risks attached to public 
services are increasingly subject to commercial as well as managerial logics. Public-
private partnerships have created new markets in risk, as did the original pioneers of risk 
commodification: the insurance industry. Risk conceived as a tradable commodity is a 
material category, acting in the world to transform uncertainties into profit (Jureidini and 
White 2000). In PFI and LIFT, secondary markets are developing with players such as 
the Secondary Market Infrastructure Fund, which claims to be the largest asset manager 
in the UK PFI/PPP market place. 
 
For PFI and LIFT to be possible, NHS organisations needed to be constituted as 
NHS Trusts – financially bounded accounting entities3. The concept of an accounting 
entity “draws a line around a set of economic resources and allows reports to be 
prepared which reflect the entity’s financial position and the economic events related to 
it” (Hodges and Mellet 1999: 278). This enables an event to appear in multiple ways and 
places; a sale appears on one entity’s balance sheet as a disposal of assets and on 
another’s as an acquisition of assets. Under PFI, different aspects of an asset 
(ownership, finance, risk, control, and benefit of output) appear in different places. 
Ownership may even disappear between the balance sheets in question. Not only is an 
asset commodified, but it is deconstructed and its component parts commodified. 
 
PFI and LIFT are interesting because they do not fit the classic picture of risk 
transfer analysed by post-Foucauldian authors such as Rose (e.g. 1996). Here risks are 
apparently privatised, but not in the sense of individualisation (passing them down and 
out of the organisation onto the individual). Accordingly, in LIFT attempts at 
“responsibilisation” (moral exhortation to behave correctly) are targeted at local public 
                                                           
2
 Obviously simplifying here, as risk is measured by multiplying impact by probability. 
3
 All NHS organisations were constituted as Trusts by the Conservatives between 1991-1995, and 
this was not repealed by Labour. 
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sector managers, who are urged to act more entrepreneurially, and associate 
themselves with the financial fortunes of “their” LIFT Company (Aldred 2007). 
 
By contrast, where risks are individualised the targets are ordinary citizens, who 
are warned that they should stop smoking, eat healthily, save for the future, attend 
training courses, etc. Under PFI and LIFT, the future recipients of privatised risks – large 
firms – are assumed to be good risk-managing subjects who respond appropriately to 
incentives. While private individuals are suspect and need to be educated (even 
threatening to deny medical treatment may leave some smokers recalcitrant!), private 
companies appear as rational actors. Failure must be the responsibility of the state’s 
failure to transfer risk effectively; the alleged failures of public sector contracting often 
actually refer to the failure by private companies to perform on time and to budget, re-
cast as regulatory failures of the state. 
 
The LIFT structure is designed to pass on risk. It creates a web of holding 
companies (FundCos) suggesting that profits will be taken out through these FundCos 
rather than through the parent LIFT Company itself4. FundCos are 90% debt financed; 
after paying off their contractors (often consortium members or their sister companies), 
and debt interest to financial backers, it is not clear how what (if anything) would be 
passed back to the parent LIFT company (and its minority public sector shareholders). 
The use of holding companies to distribute profits and risks is not surprising: risk 
specialists advise PFI consortia “to transfer risks out of the [Special Purpose Vehicle – 
i.e. in this case, the FundCos] down to subcontractors or suppliers, leaving very little risk 
to be borne by the SPV itself” (Walker 2005). 
 
 However, this structure does suggest that the corporations involved in LIFT may 
be themselves be more interested in avoiding risk than in managing it themselves. 
Indeed, the majority of my interviewees agreed that private sector companies, in 
particular banks, were highly risk averse, which in itself implies that the public sector 
may not get good value for money when attempting to transfer risk to the private sector. 
Public sector managers in case study and comparator areas argued that the private 
sector had not been “as clever as we’d have liked” (in one manager’s words) and had 
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failed to take the initiative in planning innovative projects (Aldred 2007). They 
complained that the private sector wanted “quick wins” and was not adept at providing 
added value and the promised synergies. One example of this on a national level is GP 
leasing. 
 
Initially, it was planned that LIFT companies would take on the risk of not only 
renting “retail” spaces, but also of renting space to general practitioners. The DH website 
states “[LIFTCo] will rent accommodation to GPs on a lease basis... NHS LIFTs will offer 
GPs flexible lease arrangements.” A paper produced by PriceWaterhouseCoopers laying 
out the proposed LIFT model argued that the NHS would benefit from this in two ways: it 
would pass on demand risk and become better able to manage relationships with GPs. 
“The key objective of the NHS to develop flexible relationships with the local GPs as part 
of primary care PPP’s [sic] could be facilitated by passing an element of demand risk 
through to the private sector” (PWC 2001:18). 
 
But instead, PCTs are taking twenty-five year “headleases” on LIFT properties 
and subletting to GPs. The NHS, not the private sector, has been able to offer more 
flexible terms to GPs, but this means that the NHS bears the risk of GPs leaving or 
defaulting. The private sector is guaranteed long-term income from the state for most of 
the premises built, minus the usually relatively small proportion of space used as “retail 
units”. Each FundCo (individual project company) represents a liquid, ready-made 
investment with contracts and subcontracts in place: owners should merely need to wait 
for income to arrive each year. One interviewee commented that it was an ideal 
investment for risk averse pension funds. It is not in the private sector companies’ 
interest to take the risk of entering into short term or uncertain leases: it reduces the 
value that they will be able to realise if and when the project is sold on the secondary 
market. 
 
This is confirmed by the generally positive Capita report on LIFT (2007:4) which 
acknowledges: “the banks are normally, extremely cautious and paranoid [sic] about any 
risk remaining within the LIFTCo/FundCo structure without it being set off to a third party 
entirely. This means they can be very pernickety and will challenge minor details.” This 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4
 This structure allows liability to be strictly limited to initial investments in each “Fundco” or 
project holding company; thus financial difficulty affecting one project will not affect investors’ 
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hardly represents an imaginative or innovative approach to risk. Indeed, in case study 
and comparator areas public sector managers argued that the private sector’s wish for 
simplicity and guaranteed cashflow inhibited novel projects. A mental health trust director 
told me that the financial institution involved in his project had imposed insurance 
charges of more than double the usual rate, and these costs had been passed on to the 
NHS organisations involved. Another manager said “[LIFTCo] want the GP surgery that 
we were going to develop, with nothing really added, maybe a community room or 
whatever. So that in effect, the project is simple and can be run very quickly.” 
 
Defining risks: the visible and the uncountable 
Despite the visibility of risk under LIFT and PFI, definitions of risk categories are 
narrow. Hood and McGarvey (2002:27) cite “the general acceptance by contractual 
partners that there are distinct and finite categories of risk that should be considered 
under PFI projects. These risks are normally categorized as design; project finance; 
construction and operation, including maintenance; demand/variability of revenue; 
technology and obsolescence; regulation and legislation risks; and residual value.” 
According to Walker (2005) the risks are apportioned as follows (at least in theory): 
 
Risks usually retained by government Risks usually transferred to private sector 
The need for the facility on the date given Meeting the required standards of delivery (i.e. if 
the project design was unable to provide the 
required service, the private sector would pay 
for rectifying the design) 
Adequacy of its overall size to meet public 
service needs 
Cost overrun risk during construction. If for 
example, ground conditions require 
considerably more extensive foundations, the 
private sector will cover those extra costs 
Possibility of a change in public sector 
requirements in the future 
 
Completion of the facility on time 
                                                                                                                                                                             
holdings in other projects. 
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Whether standards of delivery (set by the 
public sector) will meet public needs 
 
Underlying costs to operator of service delivery, 
and future costs associated with the asset 
Extent to which the facility is used or not 
used over the contract's life 
Risk of industrial action or physical damage to 
the asset 
General inflation risk - unitary charges are 
linked to inflation. 
Certain market risks associated with the 
scheme (for example, on a road scheme, the 
actual traffic using the road5). 
 
PPP is selective, quantifying certain possibilities and turns them into “risks” while 
others remain qualitative “uncertainties” (Broadbent et al 2005). Broadbent et al describe 
this as an “accounting logic”. However, it could be a mistake to assume that possibilities 
are unquantifiable merely because they are currently unquantified. PPP creates frames 
for viewing the world; some issues appear and some disappear; some possibilities 
become countable and others obscure. Indeed, Froud (2003) argues that many 
possibilities seen under PFI as quantifiable turn out to be radically uncertain. Risk 
classification is necessarily political: the distinction between qualitative and quantitative 
is not merely a property of the particular facts under consideration but also of the social 
context within which they become data, and the questions asked of them. 
 
The possibility of refinancing PFI schemes was simply not considered and 
measured. But this could have been foreseen; the risks borne by contractors are slanted 
towards the beginning of the contract, therefore it is logical to expect that following this 
period financial contracts could be renegotiated to take advantage of the investment’s 
lowered risk profile. Sadiq Khan MP made this very point (House of Commons Select 
Committee on Public Accounts 2007:30). Refinancing is scarcely an obscure or difficult 
concept; home owners frequently refinance their mortgages when market conditions or 
their personal circumstances change. But given a context in which government wished 
to reassure the private sector over a new initiative, the responsible state agencies were 
not interested in measuring and taking precautions to share private sector windfall gains. 
                                                           
5
 I would argue that in practice, the private sector tends to avoid assuming demand risks – 
certainly in LIFT this is the case (see above). 
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 The code introduced in 2002 for sharing refinancing gains with the public sector 
has apparently also had predictable consequences (House of Commons Select 
Committee on Public Accounts 2007). Instead of refinancing deals, consortia are selling 
them on the secondary market, there being no requirement for companies to pass on 
any of the gains made by selling shares in PFI projects. Furthermore, where refinancing 
does happen, gains made by the public sector often involve additional risk. The 
Department of Health even requires NHS Trusts to take refinancing proceeds over the 
life of a contract, putting these gains at risk if the consortium fails (whereas the private 
sector partner can take all their refinancing gains at once, reducing their incentive to 
keep the contract going). 
 
 In Walker’s table it is apparent that a heavy burden remains with the public 
sector: the state must create and populate contractual structures that will enable the 
exercise of the “private sector virtues” that it seeks. The public sector must specify the 
contracts to a high level of detail and accuracy. There is limited room for mistakes or 
afterthoughts where the service specifications must be made up front for a project lasting 
twenty-five years or more. And while the risk transfer methodology assumes that the 
overall risk burden will be the same in a PPP or publicly funded project, it could be 
argued that PPP amplifies and creates risks rather than diverting them away from the 
state.  Jenkinson (2003) claims that while contracting for private finance makes 
previously implicit risks explicit, this carries its own costs, particular in complex cases 
where contracts remain incomplete; and the majority of cases are complex. 
 
Dewatripont and Legros point out that rather than being a result of catastrophic 
state failure, cost over-runs may actually be functional for public procurement. They 
could protect the state against worse consequences: “while cost overruns are often 
viewed as illustrating the failure of traditional public procurement, we have pointed out 
that they can be equilibrium phenomena. There are costs associated with trying to make 
contracts complete and specifying a project in such a way that its characteristics will not 
change later on.” (Dewatripont and Legros 2005:141). 
 
While the value for money process assumes an identical project in each case, as 
Froud (2003:577) points out “Whether PFI is, in fact, cheaper in monetary terms is 
difficult to assess because the project that results is not necessarily the same as that 
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which would have been funded using conventional finance.” PFI and LIFT encourage the 
building of new hospitals and health centres, more profitable than refurbishment projects. 
In a number of PFI projects, including Walsgrave Hospital in Coventry, the Edinburgh 
Royal Infirmary, and Norwich and Norfolk University Hospital, city centre sites have been 
sold off to developers and hospitals relocated to out of town sites. In Plymouth the 
Derriford Hospital project became a dramatically larger and costlier project in order to 
attract PFI finance, before being scaled down again after the failure to sign a contract. 
 
 Thus the PFI process itself may create increased costs, and increased risks 
and/or uncertainty. Where hospitals move to out-of-town sites, there are associated 
environmental and public health costs due to increased reliance on car travel. Out-of-
town sites are often inaccessible by foot or by bicycle, and public transport systems are 
constructed to allow movement into and out of town centres, not to allow movement 
between out of town sites (e.g. residential suburb to greenfield hospital site). LIFT seems 
to be producing a similar pattern, although on a smaller scale. For example, in one of the 
case study boroughs, the PCT recently produced a plan for four LIFT primary care 
super-centres to serve a population of over 200,000. The borough in question is 
notorious for its poor transport links within the area and a number of residents’ 
campaigns have begun campaigning against plans to close local GP surgeries. 
 
Vining and Boardman (2006) found that P3 (PPP in Canada) often involved high 
transaction costs, which were aggravated by complexity and by firms attempting to 
transfer risk (e.g. through setting up specialised companies and through maintaining high 
debt-to-equity ratios). This is a feature of the LIFT arrangements. While there are 
restrictions on the sale of LIFTCo shares, each individual project or set of bundled 
projects are not owned by the LIFT Company but by separate FundCos. This enables 
the development of a secondary market allowing the private sector investors to sell 
shares in projects without seeking the public sector’s permission6, and an interviewee at 
Partnerships UK confirmed to me that this is intentional. 
 
LIFT and PFI have encouraged the public sector to view risk from the perspective 
of the “private sector partners”, who prioritise the financial and in particular, shareholder 
                                                           
6 Although in the case of  LIFT, as the local public sector organisations own a minority shareholding in the 
FundCos, they would share 20% of  the financial gains from such a transaction. 
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value. A business-friendly discourse has renamed “local health services” as “local health 
economies”, while NHS Primary Care Trusts’ Health Improvement Plans have been 
renamed as Strategic Services Development Plans. This signals a shift towards a 
generic approach to service provision encouraged by the involvement of key private 
sector personnel with generic business experience but often little specialist health 
knowledge (Aldred 2007a). This in itself may be viewed as a risky strategy: the NHS has 
considerable public support and is viewed as (potentially) embodying a widely held ideal, 
as well as being an actually existing service. 
 
Off the balance sheet: social risks and social regulation  
 
The approach to risk management used in PPP projects “does not lend itself to 
the incorporation of ... social risk factors” (Hood and McGarvey 2002:27). Partnership for 
Health’s LIFT guidance focuses on economic assessments, with no recommendation 
that PCTs or LIFT companies undertake Health Impact Assessments. As accounting 
entities, NHS Trusts must achieve financial balance or a return on capital employed. In 
addition, they have clinical targets to meet. A broader public mission may be jeopardised 
by the presence of PFI or LIFT payments high up the Trust’s priority list. In areas with 
costly PFI schemes there are reports of plans to downgrade or close remaining non-PFI 
hospitals; critics argue that such hospitals are facing service cuts primarily because 
downgrading PFI hospitals saves less money as the PFI consortium would still receive 
its annual charge (Hellowell and Pollock 2006).  
 
The economic analysis underlying PPP is narrowly contractual and pays little 
attention to issues of power that can lead to supplier dominance (Lonsdale 2005). This 
may be particularly important here: buying in the NHS is decentralised, and small teams 
in Trusts must manage relationships with many firms, most of which have highly 
sophisticated selling capacities. In the case study area NHS managers responsible for 
overseeing LIFT – let alone GPs and others – often had trouble understanding how the 
system worked (Aldred 2007a). Lonsdale argues that a purely economic (in narrow 
terms) analysis of PFI is misplaced, because (2005:242) “[in PFI] political imperatives 
often dominate economic rationality.” He gives as an example repeated statements by 
ministers to the effect that “PFI is the only game in town”. This weakened public sector 
bodies’ bargaining position vis-à-vis suppliers. 
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Despite the dominance of economic arguments, proponents argue that LIFT 
embeds social criteria into decision-making through its risk profile, creating the incentive 
for private firms to build sustainably and so save on maintenance costs. A National 
Electronic Library for Health management briefing states that “LIFT schemes offer the 
opportunity to ensure that new primary care premises contribute towards healthier local 
economies and a better environment eg local procurement, building to minimise energy 
use.” (Cawthra 2007). Similarly, one LIFT Company claims: “The relationship between 
capital, lifecycle and maintenance costs is such that small increases in capital cost can 
deliver larger savings in lifecycle and maintenance costs, and since LIFTCo is 
responsible for all these costs there is a clear incentive to optimise ... LIFTCo’s ability to 
take on development risk (either on its own account or through its private sector partner) 
ensures that the full development potential of NHS sites can be realised, often in ways 
that contribute to local regeneration.” (Building Better Health undated). 
 
But firstly, it is possible that a LIFTCo will not act “rationally” in this way, instead 
relying on its monopoly power and superior bargaining capacity to force concessions 
from the public sector body over the term of the contract. Given limited liability, private 
sector investors can walk away and only lose their initial investment. However, the public 
sector cannot afford to lose health centres and hospitals, and so must always be in a 
weaker bargaining position, particularly where there is fragmentation of the purchasing 
agency as in this case. Ball et al (2003:282) state that “there is some evidence to 
support the assertion that imposing significant penalties where the risk outcome goes 
against the private contractor is difficult.” They point out that in conventional procurement 
(where the private sector is commissioned to build a particular building, or supply 
particular goods, which will then be purchased by the public sector) by no means all 
risks rest with the public sector, and the risk of being overcharged in the event of a 
change in client specifications is actually less because of the greater provision of 
detailed cost and input information. 
 
The PWC (2001) report that planned LIFT states: ‘Given that the joint venture will 
be substantially owned by the public sector, and that it will be co-ordinating the delivery 
of certain public services, it will be important to minimise potential for embarrassment 
arising from its “failure [sic].’ This is a key question as yet unresolved: to what extent will 
the government allow PPPs responsible for key public services to fail? However, 
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“embarrassment” structures a power differential into the heart of the partnership 
relationship. For the private sector, “potential for embarrassment” can represent a key 
advantage of joint ventures: the de facto assumption of additional risk by the public 
sector, which cannot allow the joint venture company to fail. The company form is 
perceived as drawing public sector decision-makers into a position of responsibility. 
“Failure” most obviously refers to insolvency, but is ambiguous: perhaps it could only 
mean the imposition of stiff penalties for underperformance, damaging the LIFT 
Company’s balance sheet? This interpretation is supported by the stern warning at the 
beginning of Version Five of the Strategic Partnering Agreement: 
 
All parties are reminded that LIFT is a true partnership in every sense of the word 
and the value of further debate over insubstantial issues should be considered in 
this light.  Both PfH and the public sector shall thereby be positively motivated to 
work with the private sector to avoid or mitigate the impact of any issues that may 
arise over the lifetime of the project. 
(PfH undated:5) 
 
Secondly, even if this power play does not happen, the risk profile model 
assumes that wider costs and benefits (a) can and will be described in financial terms 
and (b) such benefits translate into financial rewards for LIFTCo and/or member 
organisations. This is not always obvious. PFI hospitals in out of town locations have 
frequently created large pay car parks, with potential negative impacts on the 
environment, health, and patients’ finances. However, such car parks have produced 
revenue for PFI consortia. In one of eight local LIFT surgery planning meetings that I 
attended, participants briefly discussed sustainable energy production as part of the 
large centre that was being developed. However, as this would have slightly raised the 
total costs of the centre, it was not pursued. Similarly, attempts to include community 
organisations have floundered due to the prioritisation of the financial. Under LIFT, the 
LIFTCo is responsible for “retail units” in centres and these are normally let out at a profit 
– hence their alternate designation as “third party income generators”. But the high cost 
of LIFTCo rents can make it hard to find any tenant, let alone a health-related or 
voluntary sector one. 
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Equalities and environmental issues may be marginalised under PFI and LIFT 
due to its contracting out model and the prioritisation of the financial. There are likely to 
be equalities issues related to the transfer of low paid support service staff; PFI schemes 
have arguably had negative effects upon female hospital cleaners, who are 
predominantly female (UNISON 2003). Such concerns are expunged from the 
assessment of PPP risks; yet hidden social risks may be bound up with financial risks. 
Other risks involve the potential loss of integrated control where staff are separated into 
clinical and non-clinical groups; researchers have argued that this can adversely affect 
patient care (Pollock 2004). Where the public sector organisation has a broad social 
remit (including for the NHS health promotion, arguably linked to environmental factors, 
work environments, and quality provision of ancillary services such as meals), this may 
remain – like the elusive PFI asset – off-balance sheet. 
 
Additional social risks result from LIFT’s financialised logic prioritising the 
development of one-stop shops rather than more diffuse care networks (Aldred 2007b). 
Services are co-located for economic benefit to LIFTCo and to PCTs, encouraging the 
development of commodifiable services. For example, leisure centres are a popular 
component of larger LIFT centres, as local authority-funded services that can provide 
long-term, guaranteed revenue. However, attention has recently been drawn to the 
additional benefits of open-air exercise such as nature walks (Mind 2007). Would the 
provision of such services from within a LIFT centre conflict with a leisure centre’s need 
to secure income, including from GP-provided “exercise prescriptions”? The current 
policy steer instead seems to point towards inclusion of traditionally acute-run services 
and welfare services, which risks primary care becoming increasingly medicalised and 
bureaucratised (creating a further set of social risks). 
 
As one frustrated private sector consultant argued, there is no value placed on 
engaging community organisations to support and promote LIFT, so no money was 
available. This led to legitimation problems further down the line. 
 
So for example if you don’t [fund and support a “social partner”] one of the 
downsides might be that a local residents group would put in a planning objection 
and that would have a financial impact on your scheme. Because it may delay it 
for eighteen months and nothing will happen at all. If you don’t get local goodwill 
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then you’re not going to be able to develop the scheme perhaps at all. And there 
have been some schemes that have been stopped by resident action. 
 
While the “risk society” thesis implies a withdrawal of trust in large institutions, 
LIFT (even more so than PFI) does not represent a shift from the large to the small. In 
fact, it is the opposite: the suppression of a managed market or network of small private 
producers and NHS organisations, and its replacement by corporate-dominated forms. 
Corporations are major beneficiaries of LIFT, and corporate forms enable the protection 
of investors through subcontracting and the limitation of liability. However, these forms 
have been discredited by anti-corporate activism and damage the perceived legitimacy 
of models such as LIFT, particularly where they are seen to threaten small producers 
and community organisations. 
 
The detachment and “unreality” (Aldred 2007a) of the LIFT vehicle thus produces 
problems of embedding and social regulation. The tension within the concept can be 
seen on the Department of Health website, which oscillates between describing LIFT as 
a local, long-term partnership and as a temporary device to kick-start investment in 
which “we can sell our shares”. NHS managers for their part in the case study and 
comparator areas complained that the private sector did not seem to be bringing 
additional expertise. They argued that firms’ risk aversion has meant bypassing existing 
networks of trust in favour of high cost solutions; for example, insisting on a nationally 
known construction company rather than a local builder. 
 
 Elsewhere I have argued that the LIFT model fails to produce governance in the 
Foucauldian sense, instead relying on a bureaucratic outsourcing model (Aldred 2007b). 
As organisations become disembedded from their social environment, social regulation 
suffers, producing unforeseen social risks. For example, Partnerships for Health initially 
seemed to assume that the involvement of local authorities in LIFT would avoid 
problems with planning enquiries (Aldred 2007). The “Strategic Partnering Board” and 
associated structures failed to secure “buy-in” even from the managers running them, 
with the SPB chair in the case study area commenting that “[t]he input has come from a 
very small number of people who actually have wanted just to get the show on the road.” 
There was little “buy-in” from clinicians or the community apparent in the case study and 
 – 19 –   
comparator areas. This makes the organisational structure fragile, in need of constant 
managerial repair and maintenance. 
 
Power and perspective: whose risks? 
 Risks and benefits of PPP models such as LIFT seem unevenly distributed. The 
bulk of “demand risk” is borne by the public sector; a future government that wishes (for 
example) to dramatically cut the prison population would still have to pay PFI charges 
(including charges for support services that would not then be provided) for any PFI 
prisons that it closed. On a more day-to-day basis, public sector managers’ freedom to 
reconfigure services in LIFT buildings is restricted, compared to publicly owned 
buildings: the LIFT Company has a monopoly over minor or major alterations over the 
contract period. By contrast, the private sector gains guaranteed security of income 
(provided it meets availability targets) while retaining the ability to sell on the project 
company. This represents a risk reduction for the private sector compared with a 
“normal” market in which demand cannot be guaranteed, yet this does not appear to be 
reflected in profit margins. 
 
 While PFI is justified by the argument that the state deals badly with risks, the 
emphasis on risk management through commodification and contract implies that the 
state is an economic actor in the same way as are firms. Yet the state has 
responsibilities and powers that are not delegated under PFI: for example, its 
responsibilities under public sector employment legislation and the Freedom of 
Information Act. The political direction of the state can at least in theory be radically 
altered through the ballot box, and private sector companies are rarely willing to take on 
such unknowable risks: hence the British state’s willingness to indemnify corporations 
dealing with ‘risky’ countries through the Department of Trade and Industry's export 
credits guarantee department. If the contract is to work as a disciplinary mechanism, the 
public sector must be prepared to allow projects to fail, in order to punish 
underperforming firms. Yet this is unlikely and arguably socially undesirable.  
 
The public sector shareholding in LIFT companies is intended to regulate NHS 
managers, encouraging them to see themselves as part of “their” LIFTCo. In addition to 
enabling risk-taking, the policy is intended to produce changed systems of social 
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regulation. However, in my research NHS managers made a clear distinction between 
the NHS and the LIFTCo, with one manager (who had helped to create the company 
and who in general supported private involvement in the NHS) horrified when I asked 
her whether she felt part of the LIFTCo. NHS managers felt responsible for the fortunes 
of the company without feeling that they had control over it. This responsibility without 
power has been identified as a feature of lower levels of the devolved state (e.g. Pollock 
2004). 
 
Meanwhile, the private companies involved enjoyed the converse – power 
without responsibility. The power imbalance inherent in the local NHS/private sector 
relationship means that risk is hardly parked “with the party best able to control it”, as is 
assumed to be optimal (Walker 2005). Local NHS primary care trusts have limited 
control over their funding allocation, which may be changed by central government. They 
lack control over the broader determinants of local health, such as income inequalities. 
Unsurprisingly, most NHS managers whom I interviewed felt alienated from the model: 
risk seemed here to be disabling rather than enabling social regulation. 
 
This article has characterised LIFT’s risk regime as representing the 
commodification of risk without its individualisation. Ultimately, risks are not privatised 
but ultimately remain socially owned, due to the nature of the service, the power 
relations involved, and (contra Douglas) private sector companies’ – and in particular 
banks’ – aversion to risk. However, the narrow framework used to consider risk transfer 
sidelines the consideration of both retained risks and the additional risks generated 
through the complex contracting arrangements of LIFT and PFI. These arrangements 
tend to squeeze out the smaller, more locally rooted actors (local pharmacists, GPs, 
voluntary and community organisations) who perhaps could have helped to ensure local 
participation in the LIFT planning process. Instead, the failure of the LIFT model to 
socially embed itself helps to produce and amplify a new set of social risk – and financial 
risks, given the high costs of the model (UNISON 2006). 
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